Abstract-In this paper, we first analyze the adverse effects of cyber-physical attacks on the event-triggered distributed Kalman filter (DKF). More specifically, we show that attacks can adversely and significantly affect the state estimation error covariance of the sensors, and, consequently, the performance of the DKF. We also show that the event-triggered mechanism in the DKF can be leveraged by the attacker to cause a nontriggering misbehavior that significantly harms the network connectivity and its collective observability. Moreover, an attacker can also mislead the event-triggered mechanism and achieves a continuous-triggering misbehavior to drain the communication resources. An information-theoretic approach is then presented to detect attacks on both sensors and communication channels. To mitigate attacks, a meta-Bayesian approach is presented that incorporates the outcome of the attack detection mechanism to perform second-order inference and consequently form trust over estimates. That is, the second-order inference for each sensor forms internal and external beliefs about the truthfulness or legitimacy of the outcome of its own first-order inference (i.e., the posterior belief about the state estimate) and those of its neighbors, respectively. Each sensor communicates its internal belief to its neighbors. Sensors then incorporate the internal beliefs of their neighbors and their own external beliefs about their neighbors into their posterior update laws to successfully discard corrupted information. Finally, the simulation result validates the effectiveness of the presented resilient event-triggered DKF.
I. INTRODUCTION Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) refer to a class of engineering systems that integrate the cyber aspects of computation and communication with physical entities [1] . Integrating communication and computation with sensing and control elements has made CPSs a key enabler in designing emerging autonomous and smart systems with the promise of bringing unprecedented benefits to humanity. CPSs have already had a profound impact on variety of engineering sectors, including, process industries [2] , robotics [3] , smart grids [4] , and intelligent transportation [5] , to name a few. Despite their advantages with vast growth and success, these systems are vulnerable to cyber-physical threats, and can face fatal consequences if not empowered with resiliency. The importance of designing resilient and secure CPSs can be witnessed from the severe damages made by recently reported cyber-physical attacks such as the Stuxnet malware [6] and the Maroochy water bleach [7] .
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are a class of CPSs for which a set of sensors is spatially distributed to monitor and Aquib Mustafa and Hamidreza Modares are with the Department of Mechanical Engineering, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, 48863, USA (e-mails:mustaf15@msu.edu; modaresh@msu.edu).
estimate a variable of interest (e.g., location of a moving target, state of a large-scale system, etc.), and has various applications such as surveillance and monitoring, target tracking, and active health monitoring [8] . In centralized WSNs, all sensors broadcast their measurements to a center at which the information is fused to estimate the state [9] . These approaches, however, are communication demanding and prone to single-point-offailure. To estimate the state with reduced communication burden, a distributed Kalman filter (DKF) is presented in [10] [11] [12] , in which sensors exchange their information only with their neighbors, not with all agents in the network or a central agent. Since nodes in a WSN are usually low-cost sensors, powered through batteries with limited energy, it becomes vital for DKFs to minimize the data transmission between neighbors as much as possible while minimizing the compromise on the network performance. To this end, several energy efficient event-triggered distributed state estimation approaches are presented that intermittently exchange information among sensor nodes, instead of continual exchange of information [13] [14] [15] [16] .
Although event-triggered distributed state estimation provides resource efficiency, it provides an opportunity for an attacker to harm the network performance and its connectivity by corrupting the information that is exchanged among sensors, as well as to misleading the event-triggered mechanism. In recent years, secure estimation and secure control of CPSs have received significant attention and remarkable results have been reported for mitigation of cyber-physical attacks, including denial of service attacks [17] - [18] , false data injection attacks [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] , and bias injection attacks [26] - [27] . For the time-triggered distributed scenario, secure state estimation approaches are presented in [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] , which are limited to either mitigating a particular class of attacks or only analysis and detection of attacks. To our knowledge, resilient state estimation for event-triggered DKF is not considered in the literature.
In this paper, we first evaluate the effect of cyber-physical attacks on the event-triggered DKF for the state estimation over a WSN. More specifically, we show that an attacker can adversely increase the state estimation error covariance, drain the WSN resources, and damage its performance and connectivity. More importantly, we show that although eventtriggered mechanisms are highly desirable, if not empowered with resiliency, the attacker can take advantage of it and cause emerging a non-triggering misbehavior, in the sense that the compromised sensor nodes do not broadcast any information to their neighbors. This can significantly harm the network connectivity and its collective observability, which is a necessary condition for solving the distributed state estimation problem. Thus, the non-triggering misbehavior can even make it impossible for the WSN to estimate the desired target state. To make the same level of damage in a time-triggered DKF, much more sophisticated attacks with more resources should be designed by the attacker. We then consider an informationtheoretic metric in the family of f-divergence functions, i.e., the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence approach, to detect adversarial intrusions in the DKF. A meta-Bayesian approach is then employed using this KL divergence criterion that performs second-order inference to form internal and external beliefs about the truthfulness or legitimacy of the outcome of its own first-order inference (i.e., the posterior belief about the state estimate) and those of its neighbors, respectively. Each sensor communicates its internal belief to its neighbors to put an appropriate weight on the information they receive from it, depending on its level of trustworthiness. Sensors also incorporate the external beliefs about their neighbors into their posterior update laws to put less weight on untrusted data and thus successfully discard corrupted information. This is shown to guarantee a resilient DKF for state estimation over a WSN. Finally, the effectiveness of the presented approach is validated through simulations.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES

A. Notations
The data communication among sensors in the WSN is captured by an undirected graph G , consists of a pair (V , E ), where V = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of nodes or sensors and E ⊂ V × V is the set of edges. An edge from node j to node i, represented by ( j, i), implies that node j can broadcast information to node i. Moreover, N i = { j : ( j, i) ∈ E } is the set of neighbors of node i on the graph G . An induced subgraph G is obtained by removing a set of nodes W ⊂ V from the original graph G , which is represented by nodes set V \W and contains the edges of E with both endpoints in V \W .
Throughout this paper, R and N represent the sets of real numbers and natural numbers, respectively. R n denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space. The superscript (.)
T denotes transposition. col(A) stands for the column vector of the matrix A. Similarly, λ max (A) represents maximum eigenvalue of the matrix A. Consider p X (x) as the probability distribution of the random variable or vector x with X taking values in a finite set. If X ∼ N (υ, σ 2 ), i.e., it is a Gaussian distribution, then
with mean ν and covariance σ 2 . E[X] and Σ X = E[XX T ] denotes, respectively, the expectation and the covariance of the random variable X. Finally, E[.|.] represents the conditional expectation.
B. Process Dynamics and Sensor Models
Consider a process that evolves according to the following dynamics
where A denotes the process dynamic matrix, and x(k) ∈ R n and w(k) are, respectively, the process state and process noise at time k. The process noise w(k) is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with Gaussian distribution, and x 0 ∈ N (x 0|−1 , P 0|−1 ) represents the initial process state. The goal is to estimate the state x(k) for the process in (1) in a distributed fashion using N sensor nodes that communicate through the graph G , and their sensing models are given by
where y i (k) ∈ R p represents the measurement data with v i (k) as the i.i.d. Gaussian measurement noise and C i as the observation matrix of the sensor i at time k, respectively. Assumption 1. The process noise w(k), the measurement noise v i (k) and the initial state x 0 are uncorrelated random vector sequences.
Assumption 2. The sequences w(k) and v i (k) are zero-mean white Gaussian noise processes with
with µ kh = 0 if k = h, and µ kh = 1 otherwise.
Assumption 3. The sensor network is not locally observable through each pair (A,C i ) for any i ∈ V , but is collectively observable through the pair (A,C) with C = Col(C 1 , . . . ,C N ).
Assumptions 1 and 2 are standard assumptions in Kalman filters. Assumption 3 ([10] , [33] ) states that the state of the target in (1) cannot be observed by measurements of any single sensor, i.e., the pairs (A,C i ) are not observable. It also provides the necessary assumption of collective observability for the estimation problem to be solvable. This necessitates the exchange of communication among sensors.
Definition 1 (Intact sensor node). Sensor nodes that are not directly under attack are called intact sensor nodes.
Definition 2 (Compromised sensor node). Sensor nodes that are directly under attack are called compromised sensor nodes.
C. Event-triggered Distributed Kalman Filter
This subsection presents the standard event-triggered DKF for estimating the process state x(k) in (1) from a collection of noisy measurements y i (k) in (2) .
Let the prior and posterior estimates of the target state x(k) for sensor node i at time k be denoted by x i (k|k − 1) and x i (k|k), respectively. In the centralized Kalman filter, a recursive rule based on Bayesian inference is employed to compute the posterior estimate x i (k|k) based on its prior estimate x i (k|k − 1) and the new measurement y i (k). When the next measurement comes, the previous posterior estimate is used as a new prior and it proceed with the same recursive estimation rule. In the event-triggered DKF, the recursion rule for computing the posterior incorporates not also its own prior and observations, but also its neighbors predictive state estimate. The sensor j communicates its prior state estimate to its neighbors if its innovation based on last transmitted prior becomes greater than a threshold after a new observation arrives. That is, it employs the following event-triggering mechanism for exchange of data with its neighbors
where α denotes the predefined threshold for triggering and x tr j denotes the last transmitted prior to the neighbors from any sensor j.
Using this event-triggering mechanism, the following recursion rule can be presented for the event-triggered DKF [15] for the sensor i as
where
is the prior update, and the second and the third terms in (4) denote, respectively, the innovation part (i.e., the estimation error based on the sensor i th new observation and its prior prediction) and the consensus part (i.e., deviation of the sensor state estimates from its neighbors state estimates). We call this recursion rule as Bayesian first-order inference on the posterior, which provides our belief on the value of the state. Moreover, K i (k) and γ i in (4), respectively, denote the Kalman gain and the coupling coefficient, andx j (k) in (4) is the predictive state estimate that is received by sensor j at time k, and can be modeled as
with ζ j (k) ∈ {0, 1} as the transmit function and is one if the sensor j transmits its new estimate to its neighbors at time k (i.e., whenever the event-triggered condition in (3) is violated), and is zero if the sensor i does not receive information from sensor j at time k and uses its old exchanged information. The Kalman filter gain K i (k) in (4) depends on the estimation error covariance matrices associated with the prior x i (k|k − 1) and the posterior x i (k|k) for sensor i, defined as
The posterior state estimation error covariance P i (k|k) and the prior state estimation error covariance P i (k|k − 1) in (7) are given by [15] 
and
Then, the Kalman gain K i (k) is designed using error covariance P i (k|k − 1) and noise covariance R i k as [15] 
Let the innovation sequence r i (k) for the node i be defined as
where r i (k) is a zero-mean white Gaussian process with covariance Ω i (k) as [15] 
Note that for the notional simplicity, henceforth we keep the sensor index i but ignore the time-indexing k from notations. We therefore denote the prior and posterior state estimations as x i (k|k − 1) x i and x i (k|k) x i , respectively. Without the time index, we represent the prior at time k +1 as x i (k +1|k) x + i . Also, the prior covariance and the posterior covariance are, respectively, denoted by P i (k|k − 1) P i and P i (k|k) P i . The event-triggered DKF algorithm ignoring the time index reduces to [15] Measurment updates
Time updates
The following theorem shows that the event-driven DKF given in (14)- (15) with the triggering condition (3) collectively minimizes the global performance function (15) using only the intermittent exchange of local information among the sensors. Theorem 1. Consider the event triggered DKF (13)- (14) with the triggering mechanism (3) the consensus coefficient satisfies
where L denotes the Laplacian matrix associated with the graph G and Γ = diag{Γ 1 , .., Γ N } with
Then, in the absence of noise, the consensus filter error dynamics in (4) is globally asymptotically stable. Moreover, the expected value of all estimators reach consensus on the expected value of the state of the process, i.e., E[
Proof. The result follows directly from Theorem 2 in [15] with relaxation on the coupling coefficient condition in (16) Remark 1. Note that the design of event-triggered DKF is not the concern of this paper. We consider the event-triggered DKF presented in [15] , which based on Theorem 1 guarantees the consensus on the state estimates of the process state in the absence of attacks. We then analyze the effect of attacks on the triggering mechanism and propose a mitigation approach.
The presented attack analysis and mitigation can be readily extended to other event-triggered methods as well [13] [14] [15] [16] .
D. Attack Modeling
In this subsection, we model the effects of attacks on the event-triggered DKF. An attacker can design a false data injection attack and affect the triggering mechanism presented in (3) to compromise the system behavior. The goal of the attacker here is to maximize the state estimation error covariance by deceiving the triggering mechanism and consequently to degrade the performance of the system. Consider the sensing model (2) for the sensor node under the effect of the attack as
where y i and y a i are, respectively, the sensor i s actual and corrupted measurements at time k, and f i ∈ R p represents the adversarial input on sensor i at time k (the time index k is removed from (17) for notational simplicity). For a compromised sensor node i, let p ⊆ p be the subset of measurements disrupted by the attacker. The adversarial input f i is unknown to the system and its effects can only be seen through the sensor readings.
Under attack on the sensor node i and/or its neighbors, the posterior estimate in the event-triggered DKF (4) for the sensor node i becomeŝ
wherex a i andx a i denote, respectively, the prior and posterior state estimates under attacks.
Using (18), under attacks, the state estimate equations can be simplified as
with µ i f a and Σ i f a , respectively, the mean and the covariance of f a i . Moreover, the first part in (20) represents the direct attack on sensor node i and second part denotes the aggregative effect of adversarial input on neighboring sensor j ∈ N i .
III. EFFECT OF ATTACK ON TRIGGERING MECHANISM
This section presents the effects of cyber-physical attacks on the event-triggered DKF and shows that an attacker can manipulate the sensor measurement to mislead the eventtriggered condition and damage the system performance either by continuous-triggering the data transition mechanism or by causing a non-triggering misbehavior that harms the network connectivity.
A. Non-triggering Misbehavior
In this subsection, we show how an attacker can manipulate the sensor measurement to mislead the event-triggered mechanism and damage the connectivity and collective observability by causing a non-triggering misbehavior as defined in the following Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Non-triggering Misbehavior). The attacker designs an attack strategy such that a compromised sensor node does not transmit any information to its neighbors by misleading the triggering mechanism in (3), even if the actual performance deviates from the desired one.
To mislead a sensor to show a non-triggering misbehavior, an attacker can manipulate the sensor reading by designing a replay attack. For example, an attacker can eavesdrop the transmitted state estimate at the triggering time instant, i.e., x i tr in (3). Then, using the eavesdropped state estimate, at each time instant, the attacker can replace the actual sensor measurement y i with the corrupted sensor measurement given by y
where γ i denotes zero-mean Gaussian noise. The following theorem shows that this attack strategy results in nontriggering misbehavior which can cluster the graph under some conditions and thus significantly harm its connectivity. To this end, we first define the vertex cut of the graph as follows.
Definition 4 (Vertex cut).
A set of nodes C ⊂ V is a vertex cut of a graph G if removing the nodes in the set C results in a disconnected graph clusters.
Lemma 1. Let a set of sensor nodes A n ⊂ V be the vertex cut of the graph G and all its sensors be under the replay attack given by (21) . Then, the original graph G clusters into subgraphs.
Proof. For a sensor node i in the set A n , based on the corrupted sensor measurement in (21), the event-triggered condition in (3) becomes
Then, according to (22) , the corrupted sensor node i always satisfies the event-triggered condition in (3) and thus does not transmit its state estimate to its neighbors. Therefore, since this is true for all states in A n , they all show non-triggering misbehavior. Therefore, they do not transmit any information to their neighbors, they act as sink nodes. Since the set of sensor nodes A n is a vertex cut, the non-triggering misbehavior of sensor nodes in A n prevents information flow from one portion of the graph G to another portion of the graph G and thus clusters the original graph G into subgraphs. This completes the proof.
We provide Example 1 for further illustration of the results of Lemma 1.
Example 1. Consider a graph topology for distributed sensor network given in figure 1. Let the vertex cut A n = {5, 6} be under the presented replay attack in (21) and shows nontriggering misbehavior. Then, the sensor nodes in A n = {5, 6} do not transmit any information to their neighbors under the designed replay attack. Moreover, the sensor nodes in A n = {5, 6} act as sinks and prevent information flow from subgraph G 1 to subgraph G 2 which clusters the graph G into two non-interacting subgraphs G 1 and G 2 as shown in figure  1 . This example shows that the attacker can compromise the vertex cut A n of the original graph G such that it shows nontriggering misbehavior and harm the network connectivity or cluster the graph into various non-interacting subgraphs. We now analyze the effect of non-triggering misbehavior on the collective observability of the sensor network. The following definitions are needed.
Definition 5 (Potential Set).
A set of nodes P ⊂ V is said to be a potential set of a graph G if the pair (A,C V \P ) is not collectively observable.
Definition 6 (Minimal Potential Set).
A set of nodes P m ⊂ V is said to be a minimal potential set if P m is a potential set and no subset of P m is a potential set. Remark 2. Note that an attacker knows the graph structure and the local pair (A,C i ) ∀i ∈ V . Therefore, an attacker can identify the minimum potential set of sensor nodes P m in the graph G and achieves non-triggering misbehavior for P m . Then, the set of sensor nodes P m does not exchange any information with its neighbors and becomes isolated in the graph G . To achieve same isolation for the minimum potential set of sensor nodes P m much more sophisticated attacks needs to be designed for each sensor nodes in time-triggered framework.
Theorem 2. Let the set of sensors that shows non-triggering misbehavior be a minimum potential set A m . Then, the network is no longer collectively observable and the process state reconstruction from the distributed sensor measurements is impossible.
Proof. To ensure collective observability, based on Assumption 3, the pair (A,C G ) needs to be observable. According to the statement of the theorem, A m represents a potential set of the graph G and from the definition of non-triggering misbehavior, the nodes in the set A m do not transmit any information to their neighbors and they act as sink nodes, i.e., they only absorb information. Therefore, the exchange of information among sensor nodes happen between the remaining graph G /A m only. Hence, one can conclude that after excluding the minimum potential nodes A m , based on the Definition 5 and 6 the pair (A,C G /A m ) becomes unobservable, and thus makes the state reconstruction impossible. This completes the proof. Remark 3. Note that to achieve the same level of damage as the non-triggering misbehavior can make, much more sophisticated attacks need to be designed for time-triggered DKFs. For instance, in Example 1 the attacker can cluster the complete graph into two subgraphs just by deceiving eventtriggered condition for the set A n = {5, 6}. On the other hand for the time-driven DKFs, to achieve this, the attacker needs to jam all the communication links from the set A n = {5, 6} to other sensor nodes or completely hijack the sensor nodes, which is practically hard to achieve at each time instant. This analysis shows that although event-triggered approaches are energy efficient, they are prone to non-triggering misbehavior, which can harm the network connectivity and observability drastically.
B. Continuous-triggering Misbehavior
In this subsection, we discuss how an attacker can compromise the actual sensor measurement to mislead the eventtriggered mechanism and achieves continuous-triggering misbehavior and thus results in a time-driven DKF that not only drains the communication resources but also continuously propagate the adverse effect of attacks.
Definition 7 (Continuous-triggering Misbehavior). The attacker deceives the triggering mechanism in (3) and turns the event-driven DKF into a time-driven DKF that continuously exchanges corrupted information among sensor nodes. Proof. To mislead a sensor to cause a continuous-triggering misbehavior, the attack signal f i in (17) can be designed such that the event-triggered condition (3) keeps being violated, i.e.,
> α all the time, which means the estimation error of sensor i becomes greater than the threshold α all the time. Based on the corrupted sensor measurement in (17) , one can write the event-triggered condition in (3) as
If an attacker injects a constant signal f i > α, then the estimated measurement C ix tr i converges to the corrupted sensor measurement y a i = C i x i + f i after some time steps and thus (21) becomes close to zero again and consequently the attacker cannot ensure continuous violation of the event-triggered condition (3). However, if the attacker changes the magnitude of its attack signal after every few iterations or sufficiently fast before the state estimate converges to the previous corrupted measurement, then the state estimate cannot follow the corrupted sensor measurement due to its variation and thus (21) can be always violated, which guarantees continuous violation of the event-triggered condition (3). This completes the proof.
A broad range of attack signals can be designed such that their variation is faster than the state estimate convergence which ensures the continuous violation of the event-triggered condition (3). For example, high-frequency sinusoidal signals or square signals or to name a few. This is also verified in the simulation results.
Note that continuous-triggering misbehavior can completely ruin the advantage of event-triggered mechanisms and turn into time-driven mechanisms which significant increases the communication burden. Since nodes in the WSNs are usually powered through batteries with limited energy, the attacker can drain sensors limited resources by designing the abovediscussed attack signals to achieve the continuous-triggering misbehavior, and, consequently can make them non-operating in the network along with the deteriorated performance of the network. Remark 4. In the existing literature, similar event-triggered conditions are presented for DKFs [13] - [14] as well as centralized Kalman filters for the remote estimation problem [17] . Based on the above analysis an attacker can achieve the nontriggering misbehavior for the mentioned existing approaches and harm the network connectivity or the global performance of the system.
Note that although we classified attacks into non-triggering misbehavior and continuous-triggering misbehavior, to analyze how the attacker can leverage the event-triggering mechanism, the following analysis, detection and mitigation approaches are not restricted to any class of attacks.
IV. EFFECT OF ATTACK ON PERFORMANCE
This section presents the recursion of the state estimation error covariance under the effect of the adversarial input and shows how an attacker can significantly deteriorate the system performance.
In the following theorem, we show that the posterior state estimation error covariance P a i under the attacks becomes
whereP a i ,P a i, j and P a i, j are the prior and cross-correlated estimation error covariances, which will be shown to be updated according to (30) - (32), Σ i f a is the covariance matrix of the attack signal defined in (20) , M i = (I − K a i C i ), and K a i is the Kalman gain under the effect of attacks and is given by
Note that according to Theorem 1, in the absence of the attack, the expected estimated states converge to the expected target state and the state estimation error covariance remains bounded as given by (8) . However, equation (24) illustrates that in the presence of the attack, the state estimation error covariance recursion evolution depends on the attackers input. More specifically, the corrupted state estimate covariance P a i in (24) depends on its priorP a i , which is a function ofx a i given in (19) . On the other hand, the deviation betweenx a i and the actual process state depends on the attackers input f a i . Thus, an attacker can inject the attack signal to increase the state estimation covariance and makes it unbounded or keep it bounded with a large bound value with a limited energy attack signal.
In the following theorem, we show that how the performance of event-triggered DKF deteriorates in the presence of the attacks.
Theorem 4. Consider the process dynamics (1) with compromised sensor model (17) . Let the state estimation equation be given by (19) in the presence of attacks modeled by f a i in (20) . Assume that attacker's distribution is i.i.d. Then, the posterior state estimation error covariance P a i under attacks is given by (24) .
Proof. Using the process dynamics in (1) and the prior state estimate in (5), one can write the prior state estimation error under attacks as
where the compromised posterior state estimatex a i follows (19) and the time-index free notations x + and x denote, respectively, the process states at time k + 1 and k from (1). Similarly, using (19) , the posterior state estimation error becomes (27) Then, one can write (26)- (27) as
(η a j −η a i ) − f a i . Now, using (6) we define the predictive state estimation error under attack as
Based on (28), the covariance of the prior estimation error under attacks becomes
Using the corrupted predictive state estimate error (η a i ) + in (29) with (P a i, j ) + = AP a i, j A T + Q, one can write the crosscorrelated predictive state estimation error covariance (P a i, j )
where P Note that the graph topology is assumed undirected and the sensor node j is a direct neighbor of the compromised sensor node i. However, all sensor nodes are reachable from the compromised sensor node in the network and all sensors, not just its immediate neighbor j, are affected by the compromised sensor node i. The cross-correlated state estimation error covariance ( P a i, j ) + in (31) is given by
whereP a i, j and P a i, j denote the cross-correlated estimation error covariances, evolving according to (31) and (33), respectively. Similarly, ( P a i, j ) + is updated based on the expression given by
Now using (27) - (29), one can write the covariance of the posterior estimation error P a i as
which after further simplification becomes
Using (30) and the measurement noise covariance, the first two terms of (35) become
According to Assumption 1, the measurement noise v i is i.i.d. and uncorrelated with state estimation errors, and, therefore, the third and fourth terms in (35) become zero. Now u a i in (28) and Assumption 1, the last two terms in (35) can be simplified as
where the cross-correlated term P a i, j is updated according to (32) . Since the attackers distribution is i.i.d., its correlation with state estimation error is zero. Using (35)- (38), the posterior state estimation error P a i under attacks is given by (24) . This completes the proof.
V. ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, we present a Kullback-Liebler (KL)-based attack detection approach for the event-triggered DKF.
The KL divergence is a non-negative measure of the relative entropy between two probability distributions [35] - [36] which is defined as follows. Definition 8 (KL Divergence) [35] - [36] . Let X and Z be two random sequences with probability distribution P X and P Z , respectively. The KL divergence measure between P X and P Z is defined as
with the following properties [35] :
The innovation sequences represent the deviation of the actual output of the system from the estimated one. It is known that innovation sequences approach a steady state quickly and thus it is reasonable to design innovation-based anomaly detectors to capture abnormality [37] .
Using the innovation sequence of each sensor and the innovation sequences that it estimates for its neighbors, we present KL divergence based detectors to capture the effect of the attacks on the event-triggered DKF. To detect the effect of attacks on sensors, we determine the relative entropy between the compromised and nominal innovation sequences of the sensor using the KL divergence measure and propose a detector based on it.
Based on innovation expression (11) , in the presence of attack, one can write the compromised innovation r a i for sensor node i with the disrupted measurement y a i in (17) and the state estimationx a i in (19) as
where µ f i and Ω i + Σ f i denote, respectively, the mean and covariance of r a i . The nominal innovation r i is defined in (11) . Since in the absence of attack, based on Theorem 1, the expected value of r i converges to zero, the statistical properties of this nominal innovation can be given by r i ∼ N (0, Ω i ), where Ω i is its variance and depends on the known variance of noise.
Using (39), the KL divergence D KL (r a i ||r i ) for the Gaussian distribution sequences r a i and r i in (40) and (11) can be written as [32] 
where p denotes the dimension of the innovation sequence. Define the average of the KL divergence over a window T as
Now, in the following theorem, it is shown that the effect of attacks on the sensors can be captured using (42).
Theorem 5. Consider the distributed sensor network (1)- (2) under attack on sensor. Then, 1) in the absence of attack, Φ i defined in (42) approaches zero. 2) in the presence of attack, Φ i defined in (42) is greater than a predefined threshold δ i .
Proof. The mean and the covariance of innovations r a i and r i defined in (40) and (11) are the same in the absence of attacks. Therefore, the KL divergence D KL (r a i ||r i ) in (41) yields zero and this makes Φ i in (42) zero. This complete the proof of part 1.
To prove part 2 of the theorem, using statistical properties of (40) and (11) , the KL divergence D KL (r a i ||r i ) in (41) can be simplified as
Using (42), one has
where T and δ i denote the sliding window size and the predefined design threshold. This completes the proof.
Based on Theorem 5, one can use the following condition for attack detection.
where δ i denotes the designed threshold for detection, the null hypotheses H 0 represents the intact mode of sensor nodes and H 1 denotes the compromised mode of sensor nodes. Based on the results presented in Theorem 5, one can capture attacks on both sensors and communication links for, but it cannot identify the specific compromised communication channel. To detect the source of attacks, we present a KLbased detector to capture the effect of attacks on the specific communication channel by determining the relative entropy between the estimated innovation sequences for the neighbors at particular sensor node and the nominal innovation sequence of the considered sensor node in Theorem 6.
Define the estimated innovation sequences ζ a i, j for a neighbor j under attacks on communication channel from the sensor node i side as
wherex a j is the corrupted communicated state estimation of neighbor j at sensor node i at the last triggering instant, with µf j and Ω i + Σf j denote, respectively, the mean and the covariance of ζ a i, j . Note that in the presence of attacks on communication channels, the neighbors actual innovation differs the neighbors estimated innovation at sensor i. According to Theorem 1, in the absence of the attack, all the sensor state estimates converge to the desired process state at the steady state, and, therefore, the innovation sequences r i and ζ a i, j are the same. In presence of the attack, however, as shown in Theorem 6, their behaviors diverge.
Define the average of the KL divergence over a window T as
In the following theorem, we show that the effect of attacks on specific communication links can be detected using the KL divergence between the innovation sequences ζ a i, j and r i . Theorem 6. Consider the distributed sensor network (1)-(2) under attack only on communication links. Then, in the presence of an attack, Ψ i, j defined in (47) is greater than a predefined threshold δ i .
Proof. Using the nominal innovation sequence r i ∼ N (0, Ω i ) defined in (11) with ζ a i, j ∼ N (µf j , Ω j + Σf j ) in (46), one can write
Then, using (47), one has
Using Theorem 6, one can adopt a similar hypothesis in (45) to detect attacks on a specific communication link. Using Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, we can capture attacks on both sensor nodes and communication links of the event-triggered DKF.
Note that the non-triggering misbehavior of a sensor node can also be detected based on the same detector presented in Theorem 5 under the presented replay attack in the section III.
For more clarity, however, we formally model the corrupted innovation and present the results for detection of non-triggering misbehavior of a sensor node in the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Consider the distributed sensor network (1)- (2) with sensor nodes showing non-triggering misbehavior. Then, in the presence of attack, Φ i defined in (42) is always greater than a predefined threshold δ i .
Proof
wherex a i deviates from the eavesdropped state estimatex i tr due to the consensus error between the sensor node i and its neighbors (as neighbors state estimates are updated based on the actual sensor measurement, which causes discrepancy between the predictive state estimates of sensor node i and its neighbors in (4)). Moreover, µ i and Ω i denote, respectively, the mean and covariance of the innovation sequence r an i . Now, using the (41), one can write
Then using (42), one has
where T and δ i denote, respectively, the sliding window size and the predefined design threshold. This completes the proof.
Note that based on the result presented in Theorem 6, one can detect the non-triggering misbehavior of sensor nodes. In the following section, we present the design of a resilient state estimator based on the notion of beliefs. Remark 5. Not that we are not restricting attackers input to any particular class of attacks. It can be any type of false injection attack signal with the objective to degrade the overall performance defined in (15) . The attacker can design a wide range of attack signals varying from deterministic signals to any stochastic signals.
VI. SECURE DISTRIBUTED ESTIMATION MECHANISM
This section presents a meta-Bayesian approach for the secure event-triggered DKF, which incorporates the outcome of the attack detection mechanism to perform second-order inference and consequently form beliefs over beliefs. That is, the second-order inference forms internal and external beliefs about the truthfulness or legitimacy of the sensors' own state estimate (i.e., the posterior belief of the first-order Bayesian inference) and those of its neighbor's state estimates, respectively. Each sensor communicates its internal belief to its neighbors. Then sensors incorporate the internal beliefs of their neighbors and their own external beliefs about their neighbors into their posterior update laws to successfully discard the corrupted information.
A. Internal belief of sensor nodes
The second-order inference forms the internal belief of sensor nodes which determines the level of trustworthiness of each sensor about its own measurement and state estimate (i.e., the posterior belief of the first-order Bayesian inference). If a sensor node is compromised, then the presented attack detector detects the adversary and it then reduces its level of trustworthiness about its own understanding of the environment and communicates it with its neighbors to inform them the significance of its outgoing information and thus slow down the attack propagation.
To determine the internal belief of a sensor node i, based on the divergence D KL (r a i ||r i ) from Theorem 5, we first define
with 0 < ϒ 1 < 1 represents a predefined threshold to account for the channel fading and other uncertainties. Then, in the following lemma, we formally present the results for the internal belief of a sensor node. Lemma 2. Let β i (k) be the internal belief of a sensor node i which is updated using
where χ i (k) is defined in (53), and κ 1 > 0 is a discount factor. Then, β i (k) ∈ (0, 1] and 1) for a compromised sensor node i, β i (k) → 0.
2) for a intact sensor node i, β i (k) = 1.
Proof. Based on the expression (53), since D KL (r a i ||r i ) ≥ 0, one has χ i (k) ∈ (0, 1] ∀k. Then, using (54), one can infer that
Now according to Theorem 5, if the sensor node i is under attack, then D KL (r a i ||r i ) >> ϒ i in (53), which makes χ i (k) close to zero. Then, based on expression (54) with the discount factor κ 1 > 0, the internal belief β i (k) in (54) approaches zero, and thus the i th sensor's belief about the trustworthiness of its own information would be low. This completes the proof of part 1.
On the other hand, based on the Theorem 5, in the absence of attacks, D KL (r a i ||r i ) tends to zero, which makes χ i (k) close to one and, consequently, β i (k) becomes close to one. This indicates that the i th sensor node is confident about its own state estimate. This completes the proof of part 2.
Note that the expression for the internal belief of sensor node i in (54) can be implemented using following difference equation
where ∆ denotes the sampling interval.
Note also that the discount factor in (55) determines how much we value the current experience with regards to past experiences. It also guarantees that if the attack is not persistent and is gone after a while, or if a short-period adversary rather than attack (such as packet dropout) causes, the belief will be recovered, as it mainly depends on the current circumstances.
B. External belief of sensor nodes about their incoming information
Similar to the previous subsection, the second-order inference forms external beliefs of sensor nodes to represent their level of trust on their neighboring sensor's state estimates. External belief decides the usefulness of the neighboring information in the state estimation of the sensor i.
The external belief of a sensor node i on its neighboring sensor j can be determined based on the divergence D KL (ζ a i, j ||r i ) in (46) from Theorem 6, from which we define
where 0 < Λ 1 < 1 represents a predefined threshold to account for the channel fading and other uncertainties. Then, in the following lemma, we formally present the results for the external belief of a sensor node. Lemma 3. Let σ i, j (k) be the external belief of a sensor node i on its neighboring sensor j which is updated using
where θ i, j (k) is defined in (56), and κ 2 > 0 is a discount factor. Then, σ i, j (k) ∈ (0, 1] and 1) for a compromised neighboring sensor node j, σ i, j (k) → 0. 2) for a intact neighboring sensor node j, σ i, j (k) = 1.
Proof. The result follows the similar argument as given in the proof of Lemma 2.
Note that the external belief of sensor node i in (57) can be implemented using following difference equation
where ∆ denotes the sampling interval. Using the presented idea of external belief, one can identify the attacks on communication channel and discard the contribution of compromised information for the state estimation. In next subsection, for notional consistency, we ignore time-indexing in beliefs while incorporating them in the presented resilient event-triggered DKF.
C. Mitigation using Internal belief and External belief
This subsection incorporates the internal and external beliefs to design a resilient event-triggered DKF. To this end, using the presented internal belief β i (k) in (54) and external belief σ i, j (k) in (57), we design the resilient form of the eventtriggered DKF aŝ
where the weighted neighbor's measurement m i is defined as
where ε i denotes the deviation between the weighted state estimate m i and the process state x. We call this a meta-Bayesian inference that integrates the first-order inference (state estimates) with second-order estimates or belief (external and internal beliefs on trustworthiness of state estimate beliefs). Assumption 4. The network connectivity is at least (2q + 1), i.e., at least half of the neighbors of each sensor are intact [19] , [38] .
Theorem 8. Consider the resilient event triggered DKF (59) with the triggering mechanism (3). Let the time-varying graph be G (k) such that at each time instant k, Assumption 3 and Assumption 4 are satisfied. Then, in the absence of noise, the consensus filter error dynamics remains bounded with the coupling coefficient γ i given in (16) , despite attacks. Moreover, the bound depends on the deviation of weighted state estimate m i in (60) from the target state.
Proof. Using the presented resilient estimator (59), one has
Substituting m i = x + ε i from (60) in (61), the error dynamics without noise becomes
where a i j = σ i, j β j and M i = I − K i C i . Based on Assumption 4, the total number of the compromised sensors is less than half of the network connectivity, i.e., 2q + 1. Therefore, even if q neighbors of an intact sensor node are attacked and collude to send the same value to mislead it, there still exists q+1 intact neighbors that communicate values different from the compromised ones. Moreover, since at least half of the intact sensor's neighbors are intact, it can update its beliefs to discard the compromised neighbor's state estimates. Furthermore, since the time varying graph G (k) resulting from isolating the compromised sensors, based on Assumption 3 and Assumption 4, the entire network is still assumed to be collectively observable. Using the external-belief and internal belief of neighboring sensors, the incoming information from the compromised communication channels is discarded. Now using the resilient estimator error dynamics in (62), if the sensor node i is confident about its own measurement, i.e., β i = 1 then (62) becomes
The proof for the state estimation error boundedness can be directly followed from Theorem 2 in [15] . On the other hand, if the sensor node i is not confident about its own measurement, i.e., β i ≈ 0 then (62) can be approximated as
where ε i represents the bounded error between the weighted state estimate m i and the process state x. As the weighted state estimate m i depends on intact neighboring sensors measurement and hence it is close to actual target state which makes ε i small or close to zero. Now following the proof of Theorem 2 in [15] , one can conclude that the state estimation error will always remain bounded and the bound depends on the deviation ε i . This completes the proof.
Based on the attack detection approach presented section V, one can detect the attacker's misbehavior and estimate the target state using the presented resilient forms for both continuous-triggering misbehavior and non-triggering misbehavior or under any other attacks. Note that the presented resilient form in (59) prevents the non-triggering misbehavior from happening and maintains the network connectivity based on neighbor's measurement. Similarly, for continuoustriggering misbehavior, the presented resilient approach in (59) discards the corrupted sensor information and avoid propagation of attacks in the network and, consequently maintains the performance of the event-triggered DKF.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents simulation results for the presented attack detection and mitigation approach. We consider a set of 5 sensors in an undirected network shown in Fig.1 , and attempt to track the position of a target. Consider the process dynamics in (1) for generating the target trajectory as 
It is shown in Fig. 3 that in the absence of the attack, sensors reach consensus on the state estimates, i.e., the state estimates of sensors converge to the actual position of the target. This result follows Theorem 1. Fig. 4 shows the event generation based on the event-triggering mechanism in (3) with the predefined threshold α = 0.8. The number of the estimation updates for sensor 1 using the event-triggering mechanism in (3) are found to be 51 for the simulated duration of 20 seconds (i.e. 200 sampling instants). The average frequency of estimation is approximately 25 Hz. Then, the sensor 1 of the network is compromised with the attack signal f 1 (k) = 10 sin(50k) after 20 seconds. Fig. 5 illustrates the effect of attack on sensor 1and it shows the compromised sensors and other sensors in the network deviates from the desired target state and results in non-zero estimation error based on the attack signal. This follows the results presented in Theorem 3. Furthermore, Fig. 6 shows the event generation based on the event-triggering mechanism in (3) in the presence of attack and one can observe that after injection of attack on sensor 1, the event-triggered system becomes timetriggered and shows continuous-triggering misbehavior. This result complies with the analysis presented for the continuoustriggering misbehavior. Now, Fig. 7 presents the result for the KL divergence based attack detection mechanism. The divergence for the compromised sensor, i.e., sensor 1 grows after attack injection at k = 20 and for healthy sensors it remains close to zero based on the attack detection mechanism presented in the Theorem 5. The internal belief of the sensor is evaluated based on the Lemma 2 with the discount factor κ 1 = 0.5 and uncertainty threshold ϒ 1 = 0.5. Fig. 8 shows the internal belief of sensors in the presence of the considered attack which is close to one for healthy sensors and tends to zero for the compromised one. Then, the belief based proposed resilient estimator is implemented and Fig. 9 shows the result for the state estimation using the resilient estimator (59). After the injection of attack, within few seconds, the sensors reach consensus on the state estimates, i.e., the state estimates of sensors converge to the actual position of the target. The result in Fig. 9 follows the Theorem 8.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, first, we analyzed the adverse effects of cyberphysical attacks on the event-triggered DKF. We show that attacker can adversely affect the performance of the DKF. We also show that the event-triggered mechanism in the DKF can be leveraged by the attacker to result in a non-triggering misbehavior that significantly harms the network connectivity and its collective observability. Then, an information-theoretic approach is presented to detect attacks on both sensors and communication channels. Finally, to mitigate attacks, a metaBayesian approach is presented that incorporates the outcome of the attack detection mechanism to perform second-order inference and consequently form beliefs over beliefs, i.e., internal and external beliefs of a sensor. Each sensor communicates its internal belief to its neighbors. Sensors then incorporate the internal beliefs of their neighbors and their own external beliefs about their neighbors into their posterior update laws to successfully discard corrupted sensor information. Then, the simulation result illustrates the performance of the presented resilient event-triggered DKF.
